## Algorand Decentralization Dashboard (xGov Proposal 3264792007)

**TL;DR:** clarify what attack you mean in the nakamoto coefficient. Great site.
What attack do you mean for the 33%? I was of the impression that the one 33% threshold was the threshold for losing liveness when nodes were Byzantine and the 20% threshold is losing liveness when there’s an adaptive adversary.

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## The xGov Council: Shaping the future of xGov

is there a requirement that councilors should review a minimum number of proposals a quarter? How do we hold them accountable that they’re contributing meaningfully, no free loaders.

I mistook this as replacement for xGovs entirely. The current plan for xGovs is promising.

**2025 Algorand Relay Program**: Vital for speed in what, inclusion into a block first or getting transactions to all nodes quickly. Does it P2P transactions won’t get into blocks as quickly as relayed transactions?

As I said it was arbitrary; the point was for an element of randomness and commitment.

XGovs should be node runners so their addresses must be known — no pools, no delegate. Doxxed by social media handle. 20 xGovs max. Anyone can select themselves to be xGov and show proof of their portfolio, e.g., what they’ve worked on, proven credentials i.e., certifications, Degrees, research papers.

This can still happen even if they vote for themselves. How do we know the members are conflicting and will be?

**Consensus rewards whitepaper concern**: Zombie nodes will be suspended.

I was able to find the pieces of code that might be helpful for suspended accounts if feasible. In the block, there’s a list of proposed updates to expired online accounts as noted on line 139-148 in block.go under bookkeeper.

Thanks for replying, my post is a mere suggestion; I’m not ripping the incentive paper apart or saying we shouldn’t do incentives at all. The idea was that if it’s already in the map, it can be used for suspension also.

I don’t see the need for the minimum; we already maintain a map of online accounts currently in memory, it didn’t affect anything. People are going to drop off themselves because they aren’t making money and spending too much maintaining a node.

A 50M account suspended is a big deal for the network. Paying 2 algos out of 50M is peanuts, given the responsibility they have. Charge 0.0001 of stake. This way we have no problems with funding node runners, and people will be incentivized to make up for how much they lost.

I was thinking along approach A, but we don’t want to limit how much stake can go online. The network is most secure if all algos are online improbable but possible. If we go the Bitcoin way, it might lead to centralization if it gets harder to mine.

**Next immediate major challenge: Blockchain Size**: The good news is that we just need enough archival nodes; with state proofs, it wouldn’t matter if we trust them because they’ll have to prove it.

**How do you put alerts on your node in case it's messing up?**: Is there a calculator for that? I.e., to know what I should be doing? For the RAM, CPU, disk, and network, what’s a good threshold to look at?

There’s algoDEA, algostudio, and algobuilder, and many more IDEs to create smart contracts on Algorand.

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**Feedback requested on proposed Q3 2022 Governance Measures**: I think there should be among the proposals to undo previous decisions, clean up work, and revisions. Governors can elect a previous decision to be undone, like a referendum or amendment. Additionally, those who go for the option to do nothing should not get rewarded for anything.

Great post. The issue, though: Governance is not investing. It’s governance. I expect to have a risk of loss in investing/trading - this is expected and acceptable. But to have that same risk to participate in governance is the point I take issue with.

**Total node/validators**: There are three steps in the protocol hence three committees with different sizes. If things don’t go as planned, there are subsequent steps with a different committee members and sizes. 1st step is proposal, 2nd step soft vote, 3rd certify vote.

The beauty is that they aren’t the same validators like in other chains. And because of its randomness, they are in different configurations throughout the protocol execution.

I don't think anyone is going to explain how sortition works and its intricacies in a thread. Your post was already muted or flagged. I could tell you that it uses a binomial distribution of the tokens is used to randomly select based on a hash.