xGov Platform Evolution - Governance Discussions / xGov - Algorand

Please enable

Requests of funding to be also in fiat currencies (USDc, EURs) … This will lead to better proposal planning and more efficient algorand distribution even for longer duration projects
Delegation - Any account should be able to delegate to any other account. If account does not vote but has delegated their voting power to different account that has voted, consider this account as if it has voted. This will lead to better knowledge based democracy and much more efficient voting.
Non public voting - Manipulation with votes must be prevented and fully open information during the voting session enhances the risks of manipulation. Please allow mixed solution of open voting with encrypted voting.

Please consider creating the Vision for the xgov. If it is only about the grants funding in long term, please state it… If it is suppose to provide any expert type decision making on algorand, such as executive decision, source code management or other please state it as well and direct all development towards this vision.

post by LoafPickle on Feb 23, 2024

LoafPickle

One thing that concerned me slightly was the high turnover rate of the council. While I’m sure this was implemented to allow fresh blood to enter and help hinder corruption, it also hinders the effectiveness of the good and honest community members.

Maybe consider doubling the term length?

post by Loedn on Feb 23, 2024

Loedn

Possible solution proposed in a discord chat is to take the approach of a staggered turnover:

Only 50% of the council at a time. This would make terms 6 months long whilst ensuring still preserving knowledge and how-tos between terms and avoiding long onboarding/ramp-up periods.

Period 1 council = A,B

Period 2 election would change only A

Period 3 election would change only B

post by fisherman.algo on Feb 23, 2024

fisherman.algo xGov Councillor 2025

The role of Xgov should not be that of a VC - speculatively gambling on future outcomes. It should be to reward those who are ACTIVELY MAKING AN IMPACT already as they are not receiving ANY support. Retroactive funding based on impact completely removes the issue but I guess it’s too radical to fund those who do the most even though the community seemed to be onboard? Who exactly at AF is making this decision that we must stick with this Xgov framework? Do I need a signed petition from every Algorand community member saying we could build a far better less complicated system?

I urge all the Algorand Foundation members to look at what Optimism is doing with retroactive grants / airdrops. They’re truly working to grow the ecosystem and support the people there. They just airdropped 10m OP to their NFT creators ($40m = ~ 220m ALGO). This is the kind of community support we need to be aiming for, recognizing those who make impact and rewarding them meaningfully, not these microscopic improvements to a broken program that will not change anything big picture.

No matter how many safeguards you put up around Xgov, it will still fail to efficiently and effectively distribute funds because no one knows the future, and because that isn’t the goal of the program, the goal is to fund proposals. The goal should be to fund those who actually make an impact / deserve it / will put funds to good use. Instead, we have the same old Xgov, where people who ‘might’ build something throw a proposal in to try and get some money, and if they get some money, then they might build it, and maybe if we’re lucky it will be used by 5 people. The point is - no one can tell the future, and no one can predetermine the impact any project will have, so why the hell are we trying? Not just trying, but being forced to by the AF. Apparently, no other design can be considered like the one I proposed with Impact DAO. It feels like it’s this or nothing and that’s truly disappointing because I keep hearing this is designed by/for the community, but as a community member I don’t feel this at all.

Milestones are a huge red flag. There have been dozens of high profile grant recipients who had milestone based grants, completed all their milestones, got millions of dollars, and the impact they had on mainnet was literally 0. Milestones ‘seem’ like a good idea until you break it down. Who is going to be responsible for judging if these milestones are completed?

Yes that’s right, a rotating group of 17 people that is voted in that changes every 3 months is going to be responsible for going through the potentially 10’s to 100’s of concurrent grants milestones. This sounds super unrealistic to me. For sure it will be an administrative nightmare for those on the council. Many milestones are technical, so for example, how will the council judge if a smart contract is working if they don’t yet have the UI (which comes in a later milestone)? They would need to be highly technical to be able to do this. And how do you get 17 highly technical people to dedicate days - weeks to this without any compensation? The whole thing to me seems highly unrealistic, overly burdensome on the council members, and STILL missing the bigger picture that we should be rewarding impact not promises / hopes / dreams. On top of all that, allowing these key roles to be voted in opens it up to be a popularity contest, meaning these council members will not be the ‘best fit for the job’, they will be ‘the loudest people in the room’. We are sacrificing accuracy for ‘fairness’ which imo is a terrible trade-off.

The fact that KYC is being forced on proposers is ugly. This should be controlled by a smart contract that does not care who the recipient ‘is’, it’s just an Algorand account. This just shows how centralized this whole process is and how unambitious we are in changing it, or anything frankly. This should not be the Algorand Foundation sending people grant money, it should be the AF funding a mechanaism which operates independently and autonomously to determine how the smart contract distributes funds.

A far better approach to funding would be designing the Impact DAO as laid out here: Proposal for the Establishment of the Impact Oracle DAO to Fund Public Goods in the Algorand Ecosystem | by fisherman.algo | Feb, 2024 | Medium

I don’t believe builders should have 0 risk when starting a project. You should not be able to show up with a pitch deck and receive free money from the foundation to build it. Where is the risk for the builder? They don’t even need to care if the project is good or bad, or if it will make a big impact or no impact. If they don’t receive funding then they don’t build it.

Since there was a lot of push back that some proactive grants should still be available in some fashion, this is the best solution I have seen to allow proactive grants to stay in some fashion, thank you Kappa for this great idea.

Make a crowdfunding App / DAO where interested users for a certain dApp to be built set up funding milestones. When the milestones are reached, the funds are given to the builder, then when the product is delivered and on mainnet the Impact DAO can judge the impact of it, and if it is seeing success, then the Crowdfunding DAO gets paid back via the Impact DAO awarding the project RGPF, and the members who funded the project get their money back + a small amount of interest, with any remaining funds going to the project themselves.

This does multiple things -

It puts someone else’s money at risk for speculative projects, not the AF treasury. This is CRUCIAL. The individual members of the DAO would risk their own money, and only get paid back if successful as determined by the Impact DAO.
It allows speculative, not yet built projects to still have a funding source.
It rewards the sharpest investors with yield as they will only make money if the projects they choose to fund are successful.

I feel like coupling a proactive DAO with a retroactive DAO is the best path forward if we’re determined to build a mechanism that can fund both proactively and retroactively. The retroactive DAO is funded via AF, and the proactive DAO is funded via community members / investors, and if successful they get rewarded via the retroactive DAO.

In summary, Algorand is currently a very depressing space for builders. Maybe 2 projects on the entire chain are profitable, meaning every other project needs retroactive funding to be viable in the short-medium term. Until scale is reached, we all need assistance, and substantial assistance. If this does not change more projects will leave the ecosystem, not because they want to, but because they’re forced to. NFTx doesn’t want to close, but there is no possible way to turn it profitable with the ecosystem the size that it is, and without public goods funding. This fact not being realized by the community / AF is deeply troubling, and will lead to more projects leaving the space than entering. We need a system that encourages people to create impact, not a system designed to handout free money with a bunch of stipulations.

post by D4O on Feb 23, 2024

D4O

Agreed 100%

When the foundation is the only source of funding, a proper system that does not involve yield farmers deciding your fate is ideal.

The solution you’ve proposed addresses this issue effectively, providing platforms with the opportunity to thrive, fueled by the optimism of the ‘We are early’ proponents.

This new system might very well be the catalyst needed for the ‘Rise of the Phoenix’ prophecy that is often mentioned to finally come to fruition.

post by leakz on Feb 23, 2024

leakz

fisherman.algo](https://forum.algorand.co/t/xgov-platform-evolution/11490/49 "Load parent post")

It makes a ton more sense to support projects that have already shown they can do something valuable. I mean, why bet on what might happen when we’ve got solid stuff happening right in front of us? It’s like choosing a rookie with a good speech over a player who’s already scoring goals.

By backing projects that have a proven track record, we’re not just playing it safe. We’re actually making smarter choices. This isn’t about being afraid to take risks; it’s about not wasting resources on what’s essentially a gamble. In the blockchain space, where everyone’s looking to the next big thing, it’s easy to get carried away by a good story. But let’s not forget, actions speak louder than words.

Plus, this approach could change the whole vibe of the blockchain community. Instead of chasing after the next shiny promise, we could foster a culture where real work and real results get the spotlight. Imagine a community that values what you’ve actually done, not just what you say you’ll do. That’s the kind of shift that could make all the difference, steering resources to projects that not only dream big but also deliver.

So, yeah, maybe it’s less glamorous than betting on the underdog with the mesmerizing pitch. But in the long run, supporting projects that have already made a mark seems like the smarter play. It’s about building on what works, learning from tangible successes, and making sure that when we do take a chance, it’s on something that’s already started to prove its worth.

My 2c.

Thanks

Talk is cheap, Algorand delivers - Silvio Micali

Let’s make xGov fit that quote !

post by Imod87 on Feb 23, 2024

I agree with @fisherman.algo and completely reject the sketch presented. His proposal is a very good template and should be seriously evaluated for its merit. The proposed xGov sketch is lacking for at least the reasons Fisherman mentioned. We could easily find inspiration by looking at the governance processes from other chains, like Fisherman did when he mentioned Optimism, evaluating their merits, learn from them, improve on them, and integrate fitting structures in relation to the possibilities Algorands tech offers - which should be plenty. It strikes me as unambitious and potentially fatal not to do so. We need to take a lot more time to get things right if this proposal is all we got to date. It feels ad hoc, faulty and at least unambitious.

In my view it is urgent for the relevance of the chain to get the network upgrade, AlgoKit and Governance processes right. We have not all too much room for additional faulty decisions draining resources and time. Following Fishermans proposal, I urge to take the necessary time to evaluate and contemplate solutions from the competition to implement a governance structure for Algorand that is exactly as progressive and ambitious as Algorands underlying tech. We should take the necessary time and do it right from the start.

EDIT: We could discuss and work out several options for governance implementations and let the community take a vote on it for direction.

post by algerstmehn on Feb 23, 2024

algerstmehn

fisherman.algo](https://forum.algorand.co/t/xgov-platform-evolution/11490/49 "Load parent post")

I can only support the idea of retroactive funding (RPGF), it’s probably the most sustainable way for our ecosystem!

As has already been said, IMHO, it’s much simpler and safer to financially reward a person or company that has already made a tangible contribution to the ecosystem, and whose real impact is easily visible by everyone, rather than the opposite.

From my personal example, I can find lots of interesting xGov proposals, but I encounter two problems/uncertainties:

I have no idea if the person or company behind the proposal is truly capable of delivering what is planned
I have no idea about the future impact of the proposal, was it really worth the money invested?

I really think that the retro funding solution would make our ecosystem more qualitative and that this would encourage more builders to come to Algorand and deliver something with a real impact for the ecosystem.

post by expertgovernor on Feb 23, 2024

expertgovernor

i like where this is going.

@fisherman.algo name me few projects that you believe achieved a great value to the ecosystem and weren’t either funded by VCs or given grant from AF. Your retroactive grant is great as supplemental funding channel, but it can’t be THE ONLY one. no serious builder will do stuff for free in ecosystem with 100 users - let’s get real and stop pretend and act like we are top10 chain and can afford to turn devs away…

post by fisherman.algo on Feb 23, 2024

fisherman.algo xGov Councillor 2025

This would require me knowing every project which has received a grant and IDK that off the top of my head, but just one example would be D13. D13 has has created a massive impact in the ecosystem and hasn’t received a grant / outside funding. He probably has created more impact than 25% of grant recipients combined.

Another example would be MNGO.

post by leakz on Feb 23, 2024

leakz

It’s interesting to note that historically, most of grant recipients in our program ended up leaving or shutting down or even not delivering at all, which really puts things into perspective. This history emphasizes the need for a more sustainable and impact-driven approach to funding.

The idea that developers can begin by bootstrapping their projects to create a small but meaningful impact is something I strongly believe in (web2 dev speaking here). It’s not just about proving their commitment but also about demonstrating the real-world value of their projects without initially relying on heavy funding.

This approach sets a solid foundation for seeking VC support or foundation grants later on. It’s a way to ensure that when projects do seek out funding, they’re already backed by a track record of impact, no matter how modest. This isn’t about leaving devs without support but ensuring we back those who’ve shown they can deliver.

I think it encourages a healthier ecosystem where funding is directed towards projects with proven potential and dedication. It’s about fostering a culture of achievement and sustainability.

post by LoafPickle on Feb 23, 2024

LoafPickle

I somewhat disagree that everything should be retroactive. We might be able to get some smaller scaled projects coming, but not attract any bigger, more complicated projects.

Sure it will help fuel the people already here, but working without a a runway is risky in itself.

I am okay with gambling on some rookies in order to help bring new people into the ecosystem and they can be evaluated on a case by case basis.

Grant farming is a big issue across web3, but there have been plenty of existing ecosystem projects that have received grants that are still here and building. I feel like when it comes to this topic we often focus on the bad grants and ignore the good ones.

post by Imod87 on Feb 23, 2024

expertgovernor](https://forum.algorand.co/t/xgov-platform-evolution/11490/49 "Load parent post")

I have no problem with major strategic funding from the Foundation to e.g. Hesab Pay & friends. Mostly because of completely different due diligence. When it comes to the proactive governance funding though, I would a priori support @fisherman.algo’s idea of a “crowdfunding DAO” over the one presented. It would be a fitting idea for a game-theoretical, decentralised and permissionless system. It would in my mind at least remedy some of the faults of the current xGov system and still allow for targeted subsidies from the Foundation.

post by AtO on Feb 23, 2024

AtO

Read the proposal from AF. Appreciate the draft.

Here are my thoughts:

Council Member Terms: The terms for the “council members” are a bit short, even with a staggered council structure–changing 50% of members every 3 months means more time is wasted having to transfer knowledge. I’d increase the membership duration regardless of how you want to add/remove council members.
Funding Types: I strongly support retroactive funding because people must have risked to build and have the actual numbers to back it up (i.e., usage of their product or actual impact on the ecosystem).

I am against proactive funding because it has so far failed for the most part. If proactive funding is something that will still be allowed… it should be only for rare instances and any project coming through for an initial funding request should be applying, by default retroactive funding. The reason proactive funding is terrible is as follows:

Proposers have no skin in the game–They are given resources early from AF and waste that away.
Proposers’ milestones are poorly established as they are set with the intention of getting funding and not showing true value/impact for the ecosystem.
KYC for Proposers: I am slightly against this idea. Unless AF is going to use KYC to go after bad actors (I don’t see that happening), I don’t see much value in it.
Alternatives to this Proposal: I think @fisherman.algo 's feedback in this current discussion is worth considering as the new structure for the xGov program, either through integration or replacement. Proactive grants, if necessary, should be funded by the public through individual DAOs/crowdsourcing, and an Impact DAO/AF can always “reimburse” the individual DAOs for successful projects post-launch and upon review.

post by Loedn on Feb 23, 2024

Loedn

fisherman.algo](https://forum.algorand.co/t/xgov-platform-evolution/11490/49 "Load parent post")

Let’s analyze this step by step:

Who exactly at AF is making this decision that we must stick with this Xgov framework?

No one, we’re simply putting forward a proposal to the community on how the platform should evolve, the community can either get onboard and help shape in the direction they want or reject it, fairly simple.

You urge all Foundation members to look at what Optimism is doing, we are! Optimism not only does rpgf, but they also do proactive grants Get a Grant | Optimism Docs just substitute Seed / Partner Fund with xGov treasury and you see we’re actually giving our community a greater responsibility / power to pick what they think is best for the ecosystem they’re a part of.

Optimism just airdropped $40M to their NFT creators

Aren’t those creators already rewarded by primary and secondary sales of their creations?

Apparently, no other design can be considered like the one I proposed with Impact DAO

Let me quote myself from the first post “This doesn’t mean that what we’re proposing is set in stone, quite the opposite.”

On the burden of 100s of milestones verification to a rotating 17 people council:

1 - numbers aren’t fixed we can increase if community feedback suggests so

2 - Isn’t your proposal allowing the DAO to be submerged by having to find, fact check, and evaluate an unlimited amount of candidates every 3 months?

KYC

Things like OFACs, AML, GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) or insert country equivalent exist and all legal entities have to abide by them, as noted in the document we can not wait to do away with kyc when DIDs arrive.

additional resources: Gitcoin's KYC - Gitcoin support RetroPGF Round 3 | Optimism Docs

You should not be able to show up with a pitch deck and receive free money from the foundation to build it.

I agree, hence why milestones, and during the discussion phase of the proposal life-cycle xGovs can ask for stricter / more robust milestones, then it’s up to the xGovs to decide if the proposal satisfies the collective risk appetite with the vote.

Now, onto the proactive feedback of your post (Kappa): I agree, it’s interesting, and we should definitely find a way to bake it into the platform

We can also find a way to skew the funding allocation more towards rpgf if that’s what the community wants, we can also enforce milestones based on adoption metrics (though easily gameable), as I said nothing is set in stone, and being proactive at this stage is the best path forward.

post by fisherman.algo on Feb 23, 2024

fisherman.algo xGov Councillor 2025

How do we reject it? It seems like all we can do is argue on this post and ‘someone’ will make the ultimate call as to what happens. Specifically, who can make the call to kill the current version of Xgov and go with an Impact DAO? It’s still very unclear.

post by GhostOfMcAfee on Feb 23, 2024

GhostOfMcAfee

Seems like we should be put them up side by side to a full Governance vote. There’s time to develop your idea out while the xGov proposal is tweaked. Let both ideas be developed based on feedback. Then, the Governors can choose.

post by Rambutan on Feb 23, 2024

Rambutan

I agree with some of the AF proposals and with some of yours. This is healthy. You make some good points and so does the AF. Here are my thoughts.

It’s definitely not too radical. This makes perfect sense. Retroactive funding is the way to go and retroactive funding should be provided by the AF. Proactive funding should come from a blend between 3 parties 1) the Builder themselves (they need to have skin in the game and put up a percentage of their own funds, this can come from their parents, from VCs, from whoever but they need to have skin in the game). 2) From the community, like a DAO. 3) AF (case by case).

We have to accept that it’s impossible to build a prefect system where every single soul is happy. IT’s JUST NOT POSSIBLE. This argument can be turned back to you as well (not saying that you are not making good points, you certainly are an asset to this community) - but what is stopping someone else who disagree with your views to say the same: “do I need to a signed petition from every algorand community…”

Just because NFT’s work on other chains, does not mean it would work on Algorand. Maybe the NFT market is already saturated? Other chains had first mover advantage on NFTs hence most of the volume is there. But overtime, I think many people started to realize that paying thousands of dollars for a stupid JPEG Image is silly. I can just screenshot an image and use it with zero consequence. So why pay 100s of thousands of dollars for an image? I love algorand but I have never ever bought an NFT not on algorand or on any other chain. Not because I don’t support Algorand, but because I think it’s a waste of money. It’s stupidity. Plus NFT market is all gamed and alot of wash trading occurs there.

I would buy an NFT if say someone came up with the idea to tokenize every already well known and popular and famous, art piece from all the popular museums in the world like Van Gogh etc… This would make sense for me to buy an NFT because I am buying something already of value but in a digital form. But for this to work, I think the museum itself needs to be the one to tokenize them as it will hold more value. If any random human were to tokenize it, it won’t work. Just a thought.

100% agreed - retroactive funding by the AF will fix this issue.

That’s why proactive funding needs to come from a blend of 3 parties - The builder themselves need to put up some funds, the community and perhaps the AF (case by case). Building a business is a risk. Building a DAPP is like building a business. If a dev has a good idea of a dapp but is a risk averse human and scared to put up their own funds - they need to get get funding from somewhere and then come propose their idea here.

Not if the builder has put up their own funds too. Milestones work well it’s the best way forward for proactive funding. And in life, best we can do is put in 100% of the effort and what happens after that is beyond our control. For builders to put up 100% of effort, they need to have skin in the game, hence why they need to put up a percentage of their own funds too.

I think having KYC could be a good idea. If you want funding from the AF, they need to know who you are. If the community is also funding a proposal via DAO, I surely want to know who the hell you are. I ain’t funding any company/human blindly - it’s stupidity. KYC will in fact limit bad actors and stop grifters coming for only the money.

Fully agree! That’s why they need to put up a percentage of their own funds.

Good Idea!

post by NFNomad on Feb 23, 2024

Agreed.

If a dev is risk averse but still has a good idea and wants to minimise those risks. She/he should keep her day job and work on it on the side. That’s how you normally build a business. Validate what you create, try to turn a bit of profit and then choose to get outside funding if you think you can accelarate. Even better would be continue bootstrapping…

There’s no such thing as a free lunch. And I don’t understand why that narrative got lost in web3. Web3 has a lot of good things, but profitable businesses/mindset and funding ain’t one of them at the moment.

Retroactive funding might indeed be the most safest way for xGov to truly make a difference for the ecosystem. Teams can use the retroactive funds to invest in new features and keep a healthy development cycle with clear impact.

post by SilentRhetoric on Feb 24, 2024

I want to share a collection of initial thoughts, some of which affirm elements of AF’s proposal and some of which would modify it:

Guiding Principle

No up-front or milestone payments. Payments should always be after a promised outcome is fully delivered. This rule is elegant because it applies equally to retro and forward grants, and it makes the program have a strong bias toward retro. Fisherman made an excellent point in this thread which I have made in the context of xGov-80: if an intermediate milestone is not usable on its own, such as a smart contract without a UI, it will be extremely difficult for the council to verify if the work was completed properly. The best case scenario is that milestone verification creates more work for the council and they become complacent. Perhaps once the system is humming along smoothly it can be enhanced to support milestones.

Expert Governor Eligibility

xGovs should be participating in consensus. This is absolutely critical to the security of the network. I expect delegation schemes for consensus could fill the gap for people who want to participate but can’t run a physical node.
xGovs should have some minimum stake. We just uncovered a botnet that is performing a Sybil attack on the current xGov program by creating thousands of accounts, presumably to farm potential future airdrops. The xGov minimum stake should be equal to whatever the new incentivized consensus protocol sets. This will make any Sybil attack prohibitively expensive.

Terms & Conditions

Open source code I have a strong bias toward open-source for xGov. It is ridiculous that previous major apps and grant recipients have not opened their source code and, in some cases, that has left users with stranded funds. Can we agree that all Algorand-related deliverables must be open source under some license? If you want to be closed-source, talk to some investors who could profit from your proprietary IP.
Single active proposal per entity. There should be a strict limit on active proposals per entity. This limits the work the council and voters need to do (see xGov Session 3 with 49 proposals and some entities submitting 3-5 separate proposals), and it also ensures that grantees are focused.

Proposers

Up-front KYC. KYC is absolutely required to stay compliant and, in my view, should be enforced before proposals make it to voting. When usable DID arrives, we can evaluate another approach.

Discussion

Standard discussion period. I think all proposals should have a 2 week discussion period so that this timeline is easy for everyone to remember.

Payments

USDC Conversion At Spot Price. The current program converts at a 30-day average price which could work in someone’s favor but this should not be a gamble. If the conversion is done at spot, the recipient can immediately convert back to Algos if they want without the chance that they were effectively forced to sell low and buy high. I appreciate that this could go both ways, but the system should be modified to avoid this negative scenario from ever occurring.

Voting

Separation of powers. I think the council members must be prohibited from voting on proposals to establish a separation of powers. The council has the power to approve payment upon delivery, so this needs to be independent of passing the proposal. This kind of segregation of duties around payment approval authority is standard practice in any institutional context.
Simple voting mechanics. The voting threshold is not clear. The given example of an exponential decaying curve i.e. x(-x/5) looks like the below. How does that map to proposals? Anyway, this is too complex. Thresholds should be intuitive for anyone to understand–perhaps simple majority of active xGov stake.

\ image1184×934 60.5 KB](https://us1.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/uploads/algorand/original/2X/0/0f295d98d8881bbd3b2750d39ba3fe63fc720e6d.png "image")

post by NFNomad on Feb 24, 2024

Initially posted my thoughts on the Discord channel. So just posting it here as well.

Thanks @Loedn for kicking this off and inviting the community for feedback.

See many great things already discussed and some of them are also in the one below, so see it as an endorsement of the idea

T&C and xGov role should include a note that it’s prohibited to vote on your own proposal. I know this is difficult to uphold without transparency, but at least naming it means people who do break rules / are being unethical.
Ditch milestones (if we don’t want to go full on retroactive). With the new funding timelines, this shouldn’t be necessary anymore. Just put in a new proposal for the follow-up. It simultaneously enforces proposers to keep their proposals effective and make an impact after each and every proposal.
Proposal categories should include an USDC max value per category as well (or at least cap it to cover the volatility part). If Algo jumps in price, even the smallest category will then become quite substantial. So let’s say: ‘50k or less than 20k in dollars’ (if legally possible)
Does AF has enough manpower to perform KYC on proposals before they passed (until it’s automated)? As it means 2x or 3x the amount of KYC might be needed vs the amount that actually passed (and make it worth it).
I’d propose a cool down period for a legal entity/individual after a proposal is handled. To ensure entities don’t create back to back proposals and first deliver value after the last proposal passed. Could be 4 or 8 weeks, or depending on the previous proposals size. Can be managed from the UI itself (so no manual interference).
What happens when a proposal passes, but the treasury wallet is empty and the top-up takes another month? Payout delayed?
Do xGov members need to vote on all proposals? At any give time? Meaning, every week they need to at least process one or multiple proposals (given the smallest category)? Kind of a big ask, looking at the previous xGov period with 49 proposals.

And of course my vote would also go to retroactive funding like @fisherman.algo is vouching for. Which in my opinion also simplifies the grants system, less prone to being gamed and simply forces to deliver first and get follow-up funding after.

post by BOA on Feb 24, 2024

BOA

interesting idea, and proposal. I’d like to see the final proposal go up against other supported finalized proposals (like Fishermans) using Algorand governance voting. Do governors really have a say on important decisions? or are measures designed by the Foundation the only choice we get to vote on?

post by Imod87 on Feb 24, 2024

On second thought, @Loedn has a quite balanced proposal and I like it in theory. The major problem with prospective funding is assessing risk:

There is great uncertainty of risk in proactive funding in comparison to traditional vetting processes. The counterparty, its capabilities and aspirations are difficult to measure at a distance. @fisherman.algo has a point in stating that assessing those risks adequately might be a fools game.
A fluid council will vary widely in effectively assessing proposals. One would typically prefer to lock-in motivated experts providing support in their given fields to counteract uncertainty. Applying a rapid rotation of three months could conflict with the complexity of the task. One might favor a more meritocratic approach.
A proactive approach requires a lot more upfront effort und cost to tame uncertainty. One of the main reasons proactive funding results has been lacking is likely that it requires a more restrictive, strategic framework under which decisions can be made. Proactive incentives on blockchain have difficult to manage counterparty risk when not streamlined. When looking at Optimism, missions and such are categorised under an umbrella of strategic goals set for the ecosystem, effectively providing a framework easing uncertainty and providing direction.

Marrying proactive and retroactive approaches under one framework might over time result in growing accidental complexity in these processes, draining disproportional time and effort, marginalising its efforts and probably resulting in overwhelming, probably conflicting monolithic structures that might make it difficult or even discourage people from contribution. Retroactive Funding, because of its reactive nature, doesn’t need as much rail guards as proactive funding. Proactive funding, in my opinion, needs an effective framework that is streamlining processes as much as possible. It requires much more upfront effort to mitigate risk.

A retroactive approach would put the risk on the participants and there is good reason to favour this approach at his time.

Algroand itself is infrastructure that should inherently offer a value proposition based on its tech. Entities building on Algorand should be enticed to do so because the infrastructure offers competitive advantages for their businesses. It is difficult to see value in projects that are effectively disconnected from the real world economy. At the end of the day businesses need to generate cash flow based on tangible goods and services and can not rely on fluffy digital trends and promises that can only be sustained by speculative narratives living inside their own echo-chamber, driven by venture capital that is, honestly, mostly not interested in long-term positions but short term gains by exploiting said narratives. As we have painfully experienced over the years.
Incentives should be focused on the major parts of the infrastructure that are critical to its operation and provide a strong foundation to build upon, to me these are to date: Network security and decentralisation (node incentives) and critical tooling like wallets, explorers etc. We are very reliant on few providers. If, for example, there happens to be a critical exploit on the Ledger HW, this would result in catastrophic effects for a signifiant portion of participants. With retroactive funds, projects that are important to Algorand, but not to date self-sufficient (or by its nature difficult to monetise but still important), like Algoexplorer and NFTexplorer, are able to operate under the goodwill they harnessed over time judged by their impact.
The major contributor to a productive community is its culture. No matter what one might think about Bitcoin, its culture is strong and incentivices itself. Fostering culture is not merely a matter of one singular program and is likely impossible to precisely influence proactively. Retroactive funding supports the growth of culture just where it happens. The approach taken with AlgoKit, making it easy to engage with and contribute to Algorand, reducing friction and fostering action by means of usability and therefore inclusion, is likely the general proactive approach to take across the board. Fostering a strong culture ultimately fulfils promises that cannot be fulfilled by xgov alone. We probably should explore ways to further community engagement across the board.

Still, proactive funding is important and should not be dismissed entirely, but I would propose to compartmentalise its structure, based on the following naive assumptions:

Enthusiasts: People enthusiastic about Algorand, contributing by tooling or other means for the sake of community, learning and discovery, can be effectively supported by retroactive funds. These funds may snowball into long-term support for these tools/projects by continued funding of milestones. It is these people who demonstrated persistence who are most likely to develop valuable tools and projects over time, in comparison to startups acting merely on financial incentives with no particular convictions to Algorand or its community itself.

Businesses use Algorand because of its underlying characteristics, like TravelX, Quantoz, etc. Their reason to choose Algorand is because it provides them with competitive advantages. Strategic funding for businesses like Hesab Pay, offering significant impact and PR opportunities, is essential.

Institutions are interested in a CP systems that are secure, persistent, and have excellent finality.

Heading link Retroactive Public Goods Funding Program

We could marry the proposals by @Loedn and @fisherman.algo by simply removing the proactive part, concentrating on “I have done X, it has benefited the community because of Y metrics, I would like to receive Z”. Since proposers are known by having already contributed to the ecosystem, it minimises uncertainty and counterparty risk, while at the same time incentivising and fostering meaningful contributions. So, instead of randomly airdropping rewards for certain projects, enthusiasts who established themselves can apply for immediate funding for their milestones judged by their activity/impact/importance.

Heading link Stategic Proactive Funding Program

On the other Hand, I would welcome a separate proactive funds program on the condition that it is very much streamlined and focused on the most important categories we consider mandatory for Algroands strategic growth. Instead of receiving a magnitude of proposals from a diverse set of themes unfiltered (which are mostly handled by the retroactive program), we might discuss the themes and missions that are most important to us to achieve and create a program spanning multiple domains, offering funds by means of milestones to qualified, KYCd candidates in tight cooperation with the foundation. This would also streamline community engagement by effectively providing an overview of said categories, their importance and weight, their status and progress made, and foster continuous discussions about strategies, categories and projects over time. By categorising and streamlining our needs to select categories of importance, reached by discussion, and provided with extensive due diligence, we gain flexibility to adjust to critical conditions, improve overall assessment capabilities, and decrease uncertainty by handpicking the most promising applicants applying per category. In my mind, strategic proactive funding should be as regulated as possible, providing the same due diligence and safeguards as applied in traditional practices. It would allow the community to engage in tandem with an expert council to allocate funds based on precise evaluations and impact assumptions. Basically quality over quantity.

This might strike a balance worth considering.

post by simonb on Feb 24, 2024

simonb xGov Councillor 2025

Lots to unpack…

xgov

Imo xgov is a good thing, and the next iteration is a big step in the right direction. We should keep evolving xgov for proactive means of funding projects that would otherwise simply not build on algo.

Why? Pretty much every big player(i’m not talking about nft projects, but services like nfdomains, dexes, bridges…) in algo at this moment only made it thanks to generous grants from AF(or investments via borderless, arington etc. - on behalf of AF - although lines here are a bit blurry) when they were starting. Many failed despites funding sure, but there are many reasons why a startup might fail - incompetence/bad intentions are not always the reason… we had a shit**y bear years, lack of liquidity in the ecosystem, lack of users… being profitable in this environment is next to impossible. and pelase don’t point to dexes…they are “profitable” atm thanks to the defi incentives from af and not because ther business model is such next gen thing - not trying to diminish all the hard work they did, but objectively speaking i think it’s hard to disagree…

retoractive grants

I agree there are individuals and teams that contributed a lot to the ecosystem without such grants so retroactive grants should be a thing too(if that was a thing, nftexplorer would still be a thing imo etc.). But my honnest oppinion is, while retroactive grants are great for rewarding people that already built stuff, it could simply be replaced by a one-time “retro-grant” distribution by AF to all “worthy” right now. Because once you rewarded these people, retroactive grants going forward are not going to have big impact/drive on the ecosystem development in the short term…and we nee dshort term boost or are we looking to miss the bull yet again, we cannot afford this.

The xgov future vision as to my understanding is that it will be used to make other decisions about algorand in the future, so it is in our best interest to make it better and not simply looking at replacing it. Or are we all happy with how current governance framework is functioning - i’m not, i would much prefer xgov to take it over - so let’s make it as robust as we can.

post by scholtz on Feb 24, 2024

fisherman.algo](https://forum.algorand.co/t/xgov-platform-evolution/11490/49 "Load parent post")

@Loedn I am in favor of having two paralel grants programs in place.

One that @fisherman.algo proposed and one that AF proposed.

Competition is good and the only question is weather AF is willing to give funds to be distributed on the multisig account of the 115 people in the fishermans list.

I dont agree with the point that retroactive grants should be the only way to distribute algos, but please give people chance to proof themseves they can build alternative grants program.

post by vidhyanand on Feb 24, 2024

vidhyanand

SilentRhetoric](https://forum.algorand.co/t/xgov-platform-evolution/11490/49 "Load parent post")

Will removal of milestones hinder bigger projects from being built via xGov funding? I do think so.

Many of the current bigger and impactful projects on algorand might not have been possible if there was no funding.

We have to fund projects that is creating maximum impact along with new ideas that will create max impact in the future. Blockchain is a fast evolving technology…

Onething we can make mandatory is a proof of concept.

xGov will only fund projects that have a POC. This will make sure that the applicant has made enough effort and there is a proof of work which the xGovs can go through before voting.

Another suggestion is to divide the total allocation into two parts one for retrospective funding and other for milestone based funding.

post by SilentRhetoric on Feb 24, 2024

I think we should separate the concept of funding milestones—which represent unfinished work—from funding large or ambitious projects.

The way the process is being redesigned to allow grant proposals at any time means that the slow quarterly cycle goes away and a project could make a subsequent proposal after a previous one is completed.

That said, in my design each proposal must deliver a standalone outcome for the community, such as a usable product or feature or measurable impact. We should not be funding unfinished pieces of things nor do we have the capacity to manage the complexity this brings.

The recent discussion of xGov-80 has already demonstrated that milestone delivery verification and when to request the next milestone is going to be a mess.

POC

I think this is a great idea as one way to help the council and xGovs understand what they’re considering.

post by Imod87 on Feb 24, 2024

I wouldn’t think about retroactive grands as a way to shower already profitable projects with additional Algo, but as a platform entities that proved their impact can turn to for additional funding for e.g. milestones or to bridge difficult times with subsidies because of insufficient liquidity in the ecosystem. Especially in times like these, those allocations might prove very handy especially in supporting projects with importance and impact but lacking in sustainability, like e.g. Algoexplorer/NFTexplorer.

Proactively funding projects solely on monetary incentives (grant-farming) on an illiquid chain doesn’t magically improve liquidity and the sustainability of said projects. In my mind, the only way to safeguard against this and improve liquidity is to target entities that not solely rely on Algorand itself for the sake of it, but who’s target is to leverage Algorand to improve or innovate on their existing goods and services, e.g. real world assets - or make them accessible to us indirectly, like cross-chain projects.

post by vidhyanand on Feb 24, 2024

vidhyanand

SilentRhetoric](https://forum.algorand.co/t/xgov-platform-evolution/11490/49 "Load parent post")

I got your point. So each proposal should deliver something that is useful for the community. This is a good thought process.

I have another suggestion that I have put forward in the discord.

If proposal deliverables is not open source, the proposer should provide the explanation for the same in the proposal. This will help xGovs to take informed decisions.

post by Imod87 on Feb 24, 2024

SilentRhetoric](https://forum.algorand.co/t/xgov-platform-evolution/11490/49 "Load parent post")

No up-front or milestone payments. Payments should always be after a promised outcome is fully delivered. This rule is elegant because it applies equally to retro and forward grants, and it makes the program have a strong bias toward retro.

Wouldn’t his effectively transform all grants into retrospective grants? I see where you are coming from. Farming grants proposal after proposal and leaving behind an unfinished product should be avoided. I guess you make a distinction on forward and retro programs based on the state of the project. So an applicant applying for a forward grant is proposing to build a product, and an applicant applying for a retro grant proposes to receive a grant based on impact. But from the perspective of active funds though, both receive funds after the fact. If we define retroactive grants simply as an option for grants by measure of impact, it could allow for projects that already established themselves to get continuous funding by applying for retroactive funds to further their development based on milestones. Since these entities are already known, they already offer significantly reduced counterparty risk.

post by SilentRhetoric on Feb 24, 2024

Yes.

In my view, this basically blends the best of both approaches.

The risk of forward grants is derived from paying before delivery, such as any kind of up-front payment or intermediate milestones that haven’t achieved any outcome.

If xGov only pays for outcomes, the program could have two proposal angles:

You already achieved an outcome, and you are requesting a retro grant award for impact already demonstrably achieved.
You propose to achieve some new outcome, and you will work toward it and only get paid if you achieve it.

I think this basically solves the biggest problem with xGov.

post by fisherman.algo on Feb 24, 2024

fisherman.algo xGov Councillor 2025

Evolving the idea based on the gigabrain feedback in the thread -

Xgov could turn into a proactive crowdfunding DAO. When I say crowdfunding, I mean users and the Algorand Foundation, or whoever wants to contribute, could put up ALGO for projects that are looking to get funding prior to launching a product (proactive funding).

The current infrastructure of Xgov could work for this with some modifications. The ALGO that gets put into the proactive crowdfunding DAO each quarter by the Algorand Foundation could be distributed based on a vote of the Xgovs. However, any Xgov is also able to personally contribute to any of the particular projects, meaning they are personally investing into this project’s future and will receive the upside and downside of doing so.

If a project turns out to be successful, then the retroactive DAO (Impact DAO) could reward the project with RPGF, and those funds can first go to pay back the investors in the proactive DAO (AF and users who personally contributed) including interest, and excess funds go to the project. Why this makes sense is because the Impact DAO rewards measurable impact on-chain and in the community. If a project makes it to mainnet and has an impact, then they will receive RPGF for this impact, and those funds can go towards rewarding the early investors who made the project possible.

How Xgovs are selected and vote should change-

Instead of the stake being derived from the amount of ALGO you have locked in governance, it should instead be every Xgov is KYC’d and has a minimum stake of x ALGO that they’re willing to deploy into projects each quarter. This is still a credibly neutral criteria for Xgovs meaning anyone is able to participate (unless you’re from a restricted country, which I personally don’t agree with but will concede on this point for expediency).

The Xgovs must deploy X amount per quarter of their personal ALGO or they are kicked from Xgov. This will ensure we have actual investors in Xgov (when you have to spend your own ALGO you’re all of a sudden a lot more interested in seeing these projects succeed).

Every Xgov should get an equal vote on how the AF funds are deployed. For example, if the AF puts 2m ALGO per quarter into the proactive DAO, each Xgov gets 2m ‘votes’ to distribute amongst the proposals. They must distribute all 2m votes, but there will be an abstain bucket for excess votes not looking to be allocated, and an ability to vote 0 on a project. The distribution should be done using the median result of the Xgovs votes, + any personal allocations from Xgovs. The Xgovs are responsible for tracking milestones and disbursements of funds. This voting structure is easy to understand, and using the median removes any of the extreme votes. The 0 vote is also highly impactful when using the median. This voting mechanism would be very similar to the proposed Impact DAO voting mechanism.

This sets up a really healthy dynamic where not only do the Xgovs have ‘skin in the game’, but they also benefit from the upside of emerging products. It allows for there to be a funding mechanism for proactive grants, but shifts the risk from 100% AF treasury funds to maybe 25-50% (depending on how we set the parameters of Xgovs contributions, as well as how much the AF contributes per quarter). It also is much more likely that we get higher quality allocation of capital which is exactly the focus we should have when looking to give proactive grants.

TLDR - Impact DAO funds retroactively and is funded every quarter by the AF treasury

Proactive DAO (modified Xgov) funds proactively, and is funded every quarter by AF treasury as well as Xgovs personally.

Changes to voting will remove the ability for whales to vote their own proposals through while also removing any outliers (by everyone having an equal stake in how AF funds are spent, and using the median).

A massive thank you to every single one of you contributing thoughts and ideas here. Please DM me on twitter your NFD and I’ll send you a Poof. I believe we’re making progress towards a beautiful, meaningful funding mechanism for the community.

post by SilentRhetoric on Feb 24, 2024

Crowdfunding

I think this is diverging too far from the objective here, which is devising a program to deploy the AF treasury’s funds for the good of the ecosystem, which is the Foundation’s mission.

post by fisherman.algo on Feb 24, 2024

fisherman.algo xGov Councillor 2025

That is still the goal, but now with qualifications for being a part of the team who decides how to distribute it.

post by Imod87 on Feb 24, 2024

Why not contemplate following the idea of collective grants from Optimism, based on missions and collective intents? It seems a very effective idea to incentivise decentralised but targeted and strategic development, with tangible impact measurements. I also like the idea of “alliances”, allowing for flexible working groups. No matter if proactive or retroactive, I think we need a framework that better streamlines intent into actual productivity. The idea of collective intent and missions fits very well with retroactive funding, but still allows for specific, targeted proactive funding where necessary. I think something like a global community roadmap, that is at the same time targeted but flexible enough to accommodate different modes of operation is quite useful in fostering community culture on Algorand by directing effort that has, to date, been scattered all over the place.

I am not much of a fan of the crowdfunding idea on second thought. I would prefer proactive funding to fall under specific “intents”. At the same time, I think proactive funding should be specialised in nature, allowing for time and proper due diligence to reduce counterparty risk, also utilising for example an experts/developer council. I think we learned that getting drowned in naked proposals is not a good idea. Like above, I think it would be a good idea to streamline proactive grants. Honestly, I think most projects are well served with the retroactive method. Proactive funds in my mind should be allocated for very strategic and specialised purposes and not comprise the main method of funding.

Also, while I share your enthusiasm, I would prefer for us to take our time in this discussion and not rush to vote about it prematurely.

post by vidhyanand on Feb 24, 2024

vidhyanand

fisherman.algo](https://forum.algorand.co/t/xgov-platform-evolution/11490/49 "Load parent post")

What about starting with minimum features and then slowly converting it into a DAO after the workflows has become efficient?

post by ussaaron on Feb 26, 2024

ussaaron

Hello all. I generally agree with all of the RPG improvement ideas, but here are some practical steps that can be taken to improve the xGov platform immediately:

Cap the amount requested per proposal. While xGov is in the pilot stage, proposers should be discouraged from submitting proposals that have very little chance of passing, simply because of the total available algo vs the requested amount.
Cap the number of proposals per session. There are a finite number of xGovs and they should not be required to review an unlimited number of proposals.
Cap the number of milestones per proposal to one. Most projects that have experience with grant proposal writing will generally want to submit a 3 milestone proposal. Logistically, this is probably not feasible for the Foundation or xGovs to handle in the pilot period.
Cap the total amount requested to like 2x total available Algo. So if there are a total of 2 million algo in the session, total amount available to be requested would be 4 million. This would obviously have to tie in to a ceiling on the amount per project so you don’t have 4 projects requesting a million each and taking up the entire session.
Limit the number of proposals per team to 1. Currently a “team” or project can submit an unlimited number of proposals for “separate” projects. But honestly, all the funding received will go in the same account and ultimately benefit the same group of individuals, so this should be done to prevent proposers from obfuscating their total requested amount by requesting it via seemingly unrelated projects. Now I’d like to note that I am not criticizing anyone who has submitted multiple proposals already, honestly right now it’s probably the best strategy to get proposals to pass. But going forward it needs to be eliminated entirely.
Penalize xGovs who engage in automated vote spreading. This is more of a step to discourage bad behavior than one that can be practically enforced. But it’s the best way to prevent platform abuse.
Strongly penalize xGovs with undisclosed proposals. If an xGov or an xGov-affiliated project has a current proposal in the session, that xGov should be required to disclose that relationship. This is the most practical way to prevent self-voting. Just require disclosure. If they want to still vote for their own project, they can’t actually be stopped from doing so, but at least they will have to own that vote.

There are many other things that can be done to improve the xGov program, but for now, in the pilot stage, these are some very practical and very easily implementable steps to improve the UX for all involved in the pilot program - the Foundation, the xGov voters, and the proposers.

post by scholtz on Feb 26, 2024

What would be your cap? The idea right now is that proposer has to calculate how much votes he can receive, what is his competition, and that is his cap. See that #168 proposal… the second wealthies person in xgov seems to propose #167 and #168 accoding to strenght of his votes, and because he did not receive support from the other xgovs only the smaller proposal got passed.

If you own 6% of xgov votes, you can create proposal that drains the xgov budget by 6%… Math is simple.

For the record next gen xgov platform will have yes/no voting for every proposal, so this will not be possible to do.

I dont think that it is good to limit number of people that may request grants. More competition is better.

Yes, current system is not very good in milestones.

Next gen xgov will be better as i hope that multisig of 20 people will be able to release the funds.

Current cap is 1x of total available algo. I dont see any reasoning in this point.

If you propose request to have more algos then there is possible voters for your proposal there is zero chance it will pass.

This is bad in my opinion. I dont want the Aramid team to be harmed because i take grant for Biatec DEX.

In real world there is term legal entity. So perhaps if you want to propose this, it might be reasonable to propose it per legal entity.

In this case I also do not like it as any project may have multiple ideas to be developed and xgovs can decide what they really want to fund and build.

I dont know how you want to track or enforce this.

Self voting is not illegal. We are living in the decentralized way, and even if I dont like the proposal #168 passing i admire that Michal has put a lot of money to the algorand ecosystem and in my opinon we need more people like him.

The fact that the xgov system can be used this way is not his fault, but it is is fault of the proposers of the system, and the fix for this is going to be next gen xgov where each proposal is going to be voted for yes/no by whole xgov community.

post by scholtz on Feb 26, 2024

I dont get it why there is no discussion regarding this.

If there is going to be 50 votes per quarter randomly each week I dont think this is good to do without ability to delegate the voting power.

post by oysterpack on Feb 26, 2024

oysterpack

Regularly scheduled “office hours” would help to keep folks on the same page.

Bi-weekly should suffice.

post by NFNomad on Feb 26, 2024

Depends on the overall stance on the governance program by the community (and the future of it). In my opinion self voting is a form of conflict of interest, therefore unethical. You basically put your own personal or financial interest above everything else. That’s not democratic and may be even harmful to the program or blockchain it’s future.

If it were to me, we’d have a code of conduct similar to Optimism (as an example). Where they have a passage that outlines rules against self-dealing in the Optimism community, including mandatory disclosure of conflicts of interest and prohibiting delegates from voting on their own proposals. Monitoring for self-dealing is done through random ballot sampling to maintain governance transparency and fairness. You can read it here: Code of Conduct - 📌 Policies and Templates - Optimism Collective

Something similar for xGov would be a good start to state what is legal and illegal. Because as long as it’s not written out, it is some sort of grey area where it’s decided by the individual itself whether it’s allowed (rather than the community and program decides)

post by scholtz on Feb 26, 2024

In the next gen xGov platform its quite clearly stated that the xGovs which will be in that small committee cannot vote on milestones on their projects…

In the general xGov vote, i think it is not applicable as it would mean that people have to disclose the accounts that they own.

Also there is another legal issue. Is legal entity A able to vote for legal entity B proposals if it consists of lets say 5% same shareholders? 20%, 50%, 100% ? What if this percentage changes over the time?

post by NFNomad on Feb 26, 2024

Point 1: that would be being a good xGovernor following the code of conduct. If not, then breaking it with potential consequences. The fact that blockchain is materially anonymous thereby difficult to 100% enforce it, shouldn’t prevent us to strive to better/more inclusive.

Point 2: yep, clearly a conflict of interest.

post by SilentRhetoric on Feb 26, 2024

I think a code of conduct that covers conflicts of interest disclosure and avoidance could be helpful even if it doesn’t have much in the way of teeth because the community could still use it as a record of norms and use social pressures to mitigate some bad behavior. With time we may be able to devise actual on-chain mechanisms to enforce it.

post by Rambutan on Feb 28, 2024

Rambutan

I am also in favor for this.

Crowdfunding is a good idea. AF funding is also a good idea. Both are worth promoting side by side.

@fisherman.algo - crowdfunding can work independently to xgov.

Terms and conditions can be set for Crowdfunding. like you said, Xgovs must deploy x amount per quarter of their own algo… etc., this makes sense. I don’t think we should link crowdfunding to xgov.

Secondly crowdfunding is basically random joes becoming investors of a project - Can these investors be co owners of the projects based on their investments or thats a bit too complicated? If I am putting my own funds, I expect a return. On the other hand, the AF job is to grow the ecosystem and not expect any return. AF Algos are given out of good faith. My personal algos would be given in expectation of something in return… Can it be tweaked somehow so crowdfunders get a share or some equity etc in the project? Is it possible for this to work via smart contracts?

post by Rambutan on Feb 28, 2024

Rambutan

SilentRhetoric](https://forum.algorand.co/t/xgov-platform-evolution/11490/49 "Load parent post")